Abstract-The vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) aims to make road traffic safer and more efficient. Security and privacy are two important but somewhat contradictory objectives. On the one hand, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) authentication requires drivers to present some individual credentials. On the other hand, drivers need privacy protections on their identities, physical locations, and other contextual information. No sensitive information should be unnecessarily exposed during the authentication phase. Therefore, anonymous authentication is expected to play a critical role in VANET. In this paper, we propose a novel biometricsbased anonymous mutual authentication with provable link-layer location privacy preservation. During its authentication phase, two vehicles negotiate their temporary session key and generate two temporary MAC addresses. These two addresses, instead of the real ones, are used in all future communication frames. We further protect the biometric privacy with the help of a biometric encryption technique. Our analysis and simulation results show that the protocol is superior and lightweight with strong security and privacy protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs), moving cars are treated as nodes to create mobile networks. As a special kind of mobile ad-hoc network, it is a promising network scenario for facilitating road safety, traffic management, as well as others, in transportation system. In VANET, vehicles will establish a multi-hop and self-organized network without a predefined or centralized infrastructure.
Similar to other wireless networks, a VANET is susceptible to passive eavesdropping and active attacks. Authentication is the fundamental procedure to protect the security of VANET. Mutual authentication helps to prevent information leakage, to prevent service abuse, and to mitigate malicious attacks. However, traditional authentication mechanisms designed for static networks or closed systems with central controls are unlikely to succeed in VANETs because of the highly dynamic network conditions. Moreover, privacy protection for VANETs is especially important. Firstly, the communication contains a number of sensitive information, such as vehicle status, vehicle location, network topology information and so on. Such information should be protected from outsiders. Secondly, if the identity of a vehicle is leaked, an attacker will successfully track it by collecting the route traffic messages. Therefore, how to achieve anonymous authentication has become a fundamental requirement for securing VANETs.
Anonymous authentication technology can provide effective solutions to protect VANET privacy [1] . However, in most of these protocols, the source and destination MAC addresses are sent in plaintext as required by communication protocols. All of the transmissions coming from the same mobile user bear the same MAC address, making it easy for adversaries to track the user. Therefore, user anonymity can be easily compromised.
In order to address this issue, we design in this work a novel anonymous authentication scheme based on biometric encryption at the data link layer. During the authentication process, a user's biometric is matched against the biometric template stored in the database through field sampling. This match will prove the user's identity. In order to protect MAC addresses from being eavesdropped, our scheme generates two temporary MAC addresses for the communicating parties. A unique session key is also generated for communication message encryption. Furthermore, biometric encryption is adopted in our scheme in order to protect biometric template from tampering [2] , [3] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II highlights the related work. We describe the preliminaries in Section III. Section IV presents our algorithm. Security and privacy analyzes are given in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Anonymous authentication is a very active research for securing the VANET. Because a VANET is a self-organized network without a fixed boundary, the traditional PKI-based approach is not suitable. Anonymous authentication scheme can be divided into four types [1] , namely, group-signature scheme, pseudonymous authentication, random silence and blind signature.
Group-signature-based schemes [4] - [7] are utilized to protect the privacy of the nodes because no public entity will reveal the originator identity of a routine traffic message.
Firstly, a short group signature scheme that supports VerifierLocal Revocation (VLR) was constructed in [4] . In this model, revocation messages were only sent to signature verifiers (as opposed to both signers and verifiers). Other researchers extended the group-signature-based anonymous authentication scheme to achieve that any public entity will not reveal the originator identity of a routine traffic message [5] , [6] . However, the cost for signing and verifying were quite high. The VLR scheme was efficient when there were only a few revoked vehicles. Nevertheless, with the number of revoked vehicles, the vehicle revocation verification procedure became very time-consuming and inefficient [7] .
The pseudonymous authentication schemes [8] - [12] are designed based on traditional public-key digital signature to achieve anonymous authentication. The basic idea of the pseudonym was proposed by Raya and Hubaux [8] . Each vehicle must store a large set of pseudonymous certificates and will choose a random certificate to sign a message at one time. However, the certificate revocation list (CRL) increased quickly as a vehicle is revoked, because all the pseudonyms corresponding to the vehicle must be added into the CRL. To solve this problem, a novel authentication scheme was proposed [9] . In this scheme, a country was divided into a number of sub-regions. By signing region-specific certificates to a vehicular, the CRL size can be reduced.
Random silence means that a vehicle can change the pseudonym in a specific time without being exposed by the adversary. At the end of the time interval, the vehicle will use a new pseudonym to replace the original one. The concept of a silent period was first proposed in [13] to protect a mobile user's location privacy. To avoid the linkability between two users, a mix-zone was formed. If the silent period was too long, the quality of service may have been affected. A scheme called silent cascade to enhance location privacy was proposed to trade off delay in silent cascade for anonymity [14] .
Blind signature ensures the invisibility of the content of the signature to the signer. Moreover, the messages signed cannot be modified. Blind signature in VANETs was first proposed by Zhang et al. [15] which was based on a blind signature scheme over ECC. The proposed protocol could not only protect the identity of each vehicular, but also dramatically reduce the movement tracking probability when the vehicles were handed over through a number of RSUs.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce several preliminaries that are foundations of our work.
A. Biometric Encryption Algorithm
Compared with token and knowledge, biometrics can represent a unique user. But biometric templates are usually stored in plaintext, so it is easy to be compromised [3] . To secure the users' biometric templates, Biometric Encryption is proposed. Biometric Encryption solution has a two-stage process: the enrollment stage and the verification stage [2] .
During the enrollment stage, the biometric image is bounded with a cryptographic key to create data as Bioscrypt. During the verification stage, the biometric image on the spot is combined with the Bioscrypt to recover the key. Bioscrypt does not reveal any information about the key or biometric feature, i.e. it is computationally hard to decode the key without any knowledge of the user's biometrics, and vice versa. Consequently, Bioscrypt provides an excellent privacy protection. The key itself is completely independent from biometrics and, therefore, can always be changed or updated. Even if the key is ever compromised, the biometrics cannot be leaked. Moreover, the key can be easily updated.
Using the Bioscrypt as the certificate reduces the storage request for the mobile users and the management request for certificates.
B. AMP+
Because of the low entropy of the password and the vulnerable quality of the password file, password authentication is not secure enough. To solve it, new password authentication and key agreement protocol (AMP), based on amplified password idea, was presented [16] . AMP can be generalized in any other cyclic groups easily; it mainly provides the passwordverifier based authentication and the Diffie-Hellman based key agreement security. In the AMP protocol, an attacker who has no knowledge of the password is unable to mount any active guessing attack. Moreover, it cannot compute the shared key established between two genuine participating principals. AMP+ protocol is based on AMP and can achieve better security than AMP.
The AMP+ protocol has been proved that it can provide perfect forward security against Denning-Sacco attack, replay attack, on-line guessing attack, off-line guessing attack, small subgroup confinement and also password-file compromise.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME In this section, we will present our pseudonym authentication in detail. In Table I , we list the frequently-used symbols. The n-th random number generated by entity X G The ellipse curve X → Y : {m} Entity X sends a message m to Y || Message concatenation Fig. 1 shows our system architecture. We consider a typical VANET, which consists of an authentication server (AS). Some stationary RSUs are deployed at the roadsides and a large number of vehicles are moving on the road. Our system aims at providing the anonymous authentication between two vehicles. We model our system into two logical layers, the security layer and the network layer in Fig. 2 . The network layer can provide routing services for the security layer and is transparent to the security layer. Therefore, in our scheme, we only focus on the security layer. The security layer can achieve anonymous authentication based on the pseudonym scheme. The working process of the system is summarized as follows:
A. System Model
(1) System initialization: Before a communication begins, every entity must go to register as a legal entity. (2) Anonymous mutual authentication: Two vehicles can achieve anonymous authentication with the help of AS. (3) Pseudonym generation: After mutual authentication, a session key will be established and a pseudonym for every user will also be negotiated. 
C. Authentication Phase
In this subsection, we discuss how to achieve anonymous authentication with the help of AS. Since the opportunistic routing service in the network layer is transparent to the security layer, we only focus on the communication between the source user U 1 and the destination user U 2 while ignoring the transmissions of intermediate nodes and RSUs.
( AS
D. Pseudonym Generation
After mutual authentication, a new session key K to secure the traffic between U 1 and U 2 will be established based on AMP+. Followed by this, U 1 and U 2 will negotiate their pseudonyms for subsequent communication.
(1) U 2 replaces h(ID U2 ) with ID U2 and computes
. r U2 is a random number. Then, U 2 sends the following message: (1) and V = S × G, and then get Q U2 by decrypting message (2) . e 1 = h(Q U2 ) and Q U1 = (Q U2 × e 1 + V) × R 1(2) is computed, and the following message is sent:
Then the message is sent:
The previous 48 bits will be used as the subsequent pseudonym of U 1 . Then the following message is sent:
Similarly, the last 48 bits will be used as the subsequent pseudonym of U 2 . U 1 and U 2 can judge that the other corresponding party knows the shared key K in the steps of (4) and (5). Moreover, each party has obtained a new pseudonym in the steps of (4) and (5).
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the performance of our scheme in terms of security and privacy.
A. Security Analysis and Discussions

1) Security Analysis: Mutual Authentication:
According to the section IV-C and IV-D, it can be seen that U 1 and U 2 can achieve their mutual authentication with the help of AS.
Anonymous Authentication: AS generates a random pseudonym for every user in the system initialization. During authentication, U 2 cannot get B 1 and F 1 encrypted by K AS . Therefore, the user can complete the anonymous communication. After authentication, a new pseudonym is generated for each user.
Nonlinkability: Nonlinkability means that, for both insiders and outsiders, (1) neither of them could ascribe any session to a particular user, and (2) neither of them could link two different sessions to the same user [17] , [18] . In our proposed scheme, U 2 cannot ascribe some sessions to U 1 . Firstly, because B 1 and F 1 are always combined with a fresh nonce and encrypted by K AS , U 2 cannot decrypt them. Secondly, anonymous authentication between U 1 and U 2 can be achieved, because they communicate with pseudonyms.
Fresh session keys: How to generate fresh session keys has been given in IV-D. Data traffic is secured, and data confidentiality and integrity can be provided using symmetric cryptography.
Backward Security: Backward secrecy guarantees that a passive adversary who knows a contiguous subset of session keys cannot discover the preceding session keys. Our scheme provides perfect backward secrecy due to the hard discrete logarithm problem in AMP+.
Reply Attack: Each principal can believe the freshness of the random number contained in the messages. The random number helps the principals to deny replay attack.
DOS Attack: Resistance to DOS attack is achieved by the two ways. Firstly, a user's pseudonym always changes as a new session begins, so it is difficult for attackers to associate different pseudonyms with the same user. Secondly, it can be seen that the first part of every message is a hash output in section IV-C and IV-D, which changes regularly after each round. For example, the first part is h(S) in the message of (5) and (6), however, the first part is h(S) in the message of (5) and (6), yet the first part turns into h(h(S) ⊕ S) in the message of (7) and (8).
On-line Guessing Attack: Resistance to online guessing attack is an inherent characteristic of AMP+. If the adversary is an active participant in a protocol, the success probability of a guessing attack against the password will be negligible. Our AMP+ protocol can defend against such type of attack because it is related to the hard discrete logarithm problem (DLP). It's clearly that a passive eavesdropper would not be able to compute the shared session key, unless he knows both R 1 and R 2 . If an active adversary masquerades as one of the principals, such as U 1 , he must guess the correct S, else U 2 will abort the protocol immediately without revealing any message.
Off-line Guessing Attack: Similarly, as the analysis of the on-line guessing attack discussed above, the adversary must know R 1(2) and R 2(2) to compute the correct K, which is impossible because of the hard discrete logarithm problem in AMP+.
Biometric Privacy: When U 1 registers with AS, AS stores B 1 instead of his biometric plaintext. B 1 does not reveal any information about U 1 s biometrics and provides an excellent privacy protection. Even if the key used to generate B 1 is compromised, the biometrics cannot be leaked. Therefore, Biometric Encryption technique can protect the privacy of U 1 's biometric template.
Differentiated Service Access Control: Differentiated service access control can be achieved by classifying mobile users into different service types. Bioscrypt is generated by binding biometrics with the key, so it varies with the different keys or the different biometrics. It is possible for a user to obtain multiple certificates with his single biometrics. Differentiated access control policies can be achieved for different services or different users requesting the same service.
Flexibility and Scalability: If service types are carefully defined and the service providers are well classified, higher differentiated service access control can be achieved, which will improve the flexibility and scalability of our proposed scheme.
Multiple/Cancelable/Revocable identifiers: Bioscrypt, similar to a digital certificate, can be seen as a user's identifier. By binding with different keys, a user can get multiple identifiers. Different identifiers are independent. Even if a single account identifier is compromised, other identifiers cannot be comprised. The comprised identifier may be revoked or replaced by a newly generated one.
We compared our scheme with several related schemes in terms of storage, protocol comparisons. We evaluated the several metrics using probability analysis in Section V-A1. We simulated our scheme in a realistic network setting and present our results in Section V-B.
The used notations are listed in Table II . as fixed parameters. Some random numbers and the session key are stored as temporary parameters. If the key length is 1024bit and the hash function is MD5, the whole storage is less than 1M, which suits the mobile devices with limited resources. The storage requirement is shown in Table III . U 1 and U 2 stand for the source and the destination respectively. 
3) Protocol Comparison: In Table IV , we compare our scheme with anonymous authentication protocol proposed by He et al. [19] and Ren et al. [17] . Please refer to Section IV-B for detailed discussions on our scheme's security properties. 
B. Simulations
Our simulations were constructed based on the Simulation for Urban Mobility platform [20] . SUMO is an open source traffic simulation package including net import and demand modeling components. A region in the city of Beijing, China was downloaded from the OpenStreetMap [21] application, then it is abstracted into Fig. 3 . In our experiments, we selected a rectangular area of 1500 by 1000 meters. We randomly generated three sets of vehicles with different average numbers (50, 60, and 70) and an average vehicle speed of 70 m/s. We considered two vehicles providing anonymity to each other if their distance is shorter than 100 meters. In the initial stage, in every second, a new vehicle will be added into the system. The departure place and the destination of each vehicle are randomly selected from the map. When calculating the trip to the destination, the vehicles adopt the Dijkstra algorithm to find the nearest way. Fig. 3 . The abstracted road map 1) Average Anonymity: In our experiments, the user anonymous number is defined as the number of other users to protect the true user's location information. Thus, the location information of the protected user is indistinguishable from the other users. When more than one user communicates with the server, the attackers cannot successful trace a user based on the user's MAC address, because every user's MAC address changes frequently. If the distance between two users u i and u j is less than the length D, u i or u j can treat the other side as the anonymity member. At a certain moment, all the anonymity member of u i constitutes u i 's anonymous set. The average degree of anonymity is defined as the average size of all the users' anonymous sets at a certain moment. By experiments, we can draw the data in Fig. 4 . In Fig. 4 , x-axis represents time, and y-axis represents the average anonymity. The value of the average anonymity decreases after the initial increase. During the initialization, there are fewer users, so the user cannot find other users in his anonymity set and the value of y-axis is one. With the simulation running on, more and more vehicles are added into the system. Moreover, due to the dynamicity of the users, each users can establish the anonymity set with other users more easily. Therefore, the average anonymity set of the system increases. But with the simulation running on, when some of the users arrive at the destination, they will leave the system. This phenomenon causes the reduction of the number of the users in the system, which reduce the average anonymity. At last, when all the users leave the system, the average anonymity becomes 0.
2) Entropy: In information theory, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. The entropy can be defined as H = − n i=0 p i log 2 p i , where represents the successful attack at one moment. X-axis represents time, and y-axis represents the entropy value. First, the probability of success correlation attack for every user is calculated. Then, the system entropy is calculated. The experiment result is shown in Fig. 5 . When the number of gradually increases, the value of yaxis will increase. When users gradually leave, the value will reduce to zero. Fig. 5 shows that more users can bring better security.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an anonymous authentication scheme based on Biometric Encryption in VANETs. Biometric Encryption not only ensures authentication convenience, but also secures the biometric template. A shared session key is derived between two vehicles, and besides that, a pseudonym for every vehicle is negotiated. Security analysis proves that our scheme can resist multiple attacks. Privacy analysis shows that K-anonymity is achieved to protect the identity for every user.
As for our future work, we will investigate the location privacy issue under the context of our proposed sheme.
